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DAVIDSON v. MICROSOFT CORPORATION: REEXAMINING MARYLAND'S ILLINOIS BRICK BAR AGAINST INDIRECT PRIVATE
PURCHASERS
I.

INTRODUCTION

A threejudge panel of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
provided the first reported decision on Maryland's Illinois Brick repealer statute regarding private party indirect purchasers. I It held
that private indirect purchasers in antitrust claims, pursuant to the
Maryland Antitrust Act ("MATA"), were barred by the Rule of Illinois
Brick. 2 Indirect purchasers, unlike direct purchasers of products, are
purchasers" [i]n the distribution chain[;] they are not the immediate
buyers from the alleged antitrust violators."3 In Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, the Supreme Court crafted the Rule of Illinois Brick, generally
prohibiting federal antitrust claims for monetary damages by indirect
purchasers. 4 The Court would later explain in California v. ARC
America Corp. that Illinois Brick was limited to an interpretation of federallaw and not necessarily binding precedent interpreting state antitrust statutes. 5 Consistent with this holding, the MATA, as amended
with its Illinois Brick repealer statute in 1982, explicitly allows governl. Davidson v. Microsoft Corp., 143 Md. App. 43, 792 A.2d 336 (2002), cen.
denied, 369 Md. 571, 801 A.2d 1032 (2002) [hereinafter Davidson II].
2. Id. at 56, 792 A.2d at 344 (holding that licensees were indirect purchasers
pursuant to the Rule of Illinois Brick and could not sustain an injury to bring
suit under the MATA).
3. Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199,207 (1990). Another practical definition is: "A direct purchaser is one who purchases directly from a
price-fixer. An indirect, downstream, purchaser is one who purchases a
price-fixed product from a middleman, who will have in large measure
passed-on' the anticompetitive overcharge to his customer." Thomas
Greene et al., Practising Law Institute Carporate Law and Practice Course Handbook Series: State Antitrust Law and Enforcement, 1252 PRAC. L. INsT. CORP. L. &
PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 1129, 1153 (2001) (citing Robert G. Harris
& Lawrence A. Sullivan, Passing on the Monopoly Overcharge: A Comprehensive
Policy Analysis, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 269 (1979».
4. 431 U.S. 720, 747 (1977). Illinois Brick did recognize limited exceptions to
the prohibition on indirect purchaser antitrust lawsuits. See California v.
ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 97 n.2 (1989) (noting that either a cost-plus
contract or a controlling relationship between the alleged monopolist and
the direct purchaser were explicit exceptions contemplated in Illinois
Brick); see also infra notes 51-53 and accompanying text. The Rule of Illinois
Brick is limited to damages claims only; Illinois Brick would not preclude a
private party indirect purchaser suit seeking injunctive relief. See Ill. Brick
Co., 431 U.S. at 747 n.3l.
5. 490 U.S. at 105.
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ment indirect purchasers to recover from antitrust overcharges, but is
silent regarding private party indirect purchasers. 6
The class action suit brought by computer software licensees against
the Microsoft Corporation, pursuant to the MATA, was dismissed by
the Circuit Court for Prince George's County in February, 2001. 7 The
circuit court's dismissal relied on Illinois Brick, as guided by Maryland
Commercial Law section 11-209,8 and Judge Motz's decision in the
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, which dismissed a concurrent consolidated private parties' indirect purchaser
claim under the Rule of Illinois Brick. 9
The court of special appeals held that private party indirect purchasers were barred from treble-damages claims, pursuant to the
MATA, by the Rule of Illinois Brick.lO While the court of special appeals' two-to-one decision marks the end of this litigation, the court
acknowledged that an indirect party purchaser, like the state of Maryland, may have a cause of action under state law in pursuing antitrust
litigation against the operating system and software manufacturer. 11
Judge Sonner's dissenting opinion revealed a statutory inconsistency in the majority's application of federal antitrust statutory interpretations as binding guidelines for interpreting the MATAI2 Judge
Sonner also implied that the legal rationales, supporting the majority's application of Illinois Brick to software licensors, may be undercut
6. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-209(b) (2000). Before Davidson v.
Microsoft Corp., the MATA's application to a private party's indirect purchaser antitrust claim had never been tested in a reported opinion. See
Jeffrey L. Kessler & Michael K. Lindsay, State Antitrust Practice and Statutes:
State of Maryland, 2 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. ST. ANTITRUST PRAC. & STATUTES 22-24 (2d ed. 1999).
7. Davidson v. Microsoft Corp., No. CAL00-07040, 2001 WL 514369, at *1
(Md. Cir. Ct. Feb. 14,2001), affd, 143 Md. App. 43, 792 A.2d 336 (2002)
[hereinafter Davidson I].
8. See id. at *1-*2.
9. In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 711-13 (D. Md.
2001).
10. Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 56-57, 792 A.2d at 344-45.
11. See id. at 63, 792 A.2d at 348. Section 11-209 of the Maryland Commercial
Law Article states that "the State, or any political subdivision organized
under the authority of this State may maintain an action ... regardless of
whether it dealt directly or indirectly with the person who has committed
the violation." MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-209 (b) (2)(ii). Rather
than seeking monetary damages, Maryland joined the proposed consent
decree between the federal government and Microsoft in United States v.
Microsoft Corp. United States Memorandum Regarding Modifications Contained in Second Revised Proposed Final Judgment, United States v.
Microsoft Corp., No. 98-1232 (D.D.C. Mar. 6, 2002). The proposed decree
was conditionally approved by Judge Kollar-Kotelly on November 1, 2002.
Id.; see also New York v. Microsoft Corp., 224 F. Supp. 2d. 76 (D.D.C. 2002).
12. Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 60-61,792 A.2d at 347 (Sonner,]., dissenting)
(noting that Maryland's antitrust law "states [that courts] should be guided
by federal court interpretations of federal statutes dealing with antitrust violations"). See also MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-202(a) (2).
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by modern economic analysis. 13 A specific economic basis for this
shift, however, was not explained. 14
As a result, future private party indirect purchasers may bring antitrust lawsuits only for injunctive relief without an additional explicit
Illinois Brick repealer amendment to the MATA. 15 Until the Maryland
legislature, the Court of Appeals of Maryland, or the Supreme Court
recognizes the economic shift described above, private party indirect
purchasers will be unable to receive treble-damage awards for violations of the MATA.
This case comment will review the application of the Rule of Illinois
Brick to Maryland's holding in Davidson v. Microsoft Corp. Part II begins
with the conception of the Rule of Illinois Brick and the policies supporting it. This comment's legal analysis will describe the subsequent
backlash against Illinois Brick by the states in the adoption of repealer
statutes and the Supreme Court's approval of them in ARC America.
The analysis will include a brief survey of Illinois Brick repealer statutes
and will acknowledge the pro-indirect purchaser interpretations of
some states with silent or ambiguous statutes. Part III will examine the
MATA and Maryland's Illinois Brick repealer statute, which amended
the MATA in 1982 in this context.
Part IV of this comment will review the holding and dissent in Davidson in light of the Maryland General Assembly's guidance in section
11-202 of the Maryland Commercial Code to follow the federal court's
interpretation of Illinois Brick. The analysis will be complemented by a
survey of relevant private party antitrust litigation against Microsoft,
pursuant to their respective state statutes, following the settlement of
the DOl's litigation against the software and operating system
manufacturer.
Part V will describe the future of antitrust claims by indirect purchasers in Maryland. While this concludes the options for the party
litigants in Davidson, Part V will embark on a review of economic analyses that have been successful in implementing antitrust law. These
intrinsic and applied economic tools may be used by future plaintiffs
or legislators in repealing Maryland's adherence to the Rule of Illinois
Brick. These tools may also allow future private party indirect purchaser plaintiffs to successfully bring treble-damage lawsuits against alleged antitrust violators and defeat summary judgment in Maryland's
courts.

13. Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 59,792 A.2d at 346 (Sonner,]., dissenting).
14. Id. Appellants' brief to the court of special appeals advanced legal theories
and factual differences, not economic theories, in their attempt to reverse
the trial court's summary dismissal. Brief for Appellant at 6-28, Davidson II,
143 Md. App. 43, 792 A.2d 336 (2002) (No. 2001-00060).
15. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-209(b).
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[W]e decline to abandon the construction given § 4 [of the Clayton
Act}-that the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the
chain of manufacture or distribution, is the party 'injured in his
business or property' . . . -in the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Court was wrong. . . .16
Federal antitrust law under § 4 of the Clayton Act creates a cause of
action for "any person who shall be injured in his business or property
by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws .... "17 Thus,
Congress explicitly created a right for private parties injured under
federal antitrust law without specific qualifications. 18 Section 4 of the
Clayton Act "does not confine its protection to consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers ... (but) is comprehensive in
its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the
forbidden practices by whomever they may be perpetrated."19
The Court faced a new challenge in interpreting the Clayton Act
regarding indirect purchasers in Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.20 The Court rejected United Shoe's defense that Hanover, as a direct purchaser, could not have incurred damages from an
antitrust claim when the alleged illegal monopoly overcharge was
"passed-on" to the plaintiff's consumers.21 United Shoe's failed defense against Hanover alleged that Hanover had been compensated
for United's monopoly price by raising the market price of its shoes to
its own consumers and subsequently should not be rewarded with antitrust treble-damages. 22
Ill. Brick Co., 431 V.S. at 729.
The Clayton Act, 15 V.S.C. § 15(a) (2000).
Id.
Ill. Brick Co., 431 V.S. at 748 (Brennan,]', dissenting) (quoting Mandeville
Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 V.S. 219, 236 (1948»; see
also Cynthia Vrda Kassis, The Indirect Purchaser's Right to Sue Under Section 4 of
the Clayton Act: Another Congressional Response to Illinois Brick, 32 AM. V. L.
REv. 1087, 1098 (1983).
20. 392 V.S. 481, 488 (1968) (holding that a defense against a direct purchaser
for violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act pursuant to the Clayton Act of
"passing-on" costs was impermissible).
21. Hanover Shoe, Inc., 392 V.S. at 488-89. The term "pass-on" describes "the
process by which a middleman in the chain of distribution who has been
overcharged by a manufacturer or by a producer adjusts his prices upward
so as to pass-on his increased costs to his own customers." Elaine K Zipp,
Annotation, Right of Retail Buyer of Price-Fixed Product to Sue Manufacturer on
Federal Antitrust Claim, 55 A.L.R. FED. 919, 922 n.3 (1981). Thus, a direct
purchaser "passes-on" the monopoly price to an indirect purchaser.
22. Ill. Brick Co., 431 V.S. at 723-24 (explaining Hanover Shoe, Inc., 392 V.S.
481). There was some scholarly debate regarding the "victory" of Hanover
Shoe for consumers because indirect purchasers could still conceivably join
16.
17.
18.
19.
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Nearly a decade later, the Supreme Court examined the indirect
purchaser doctrine as a cause of action in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois. 23
Illinois, engaged in construction contracts with various masonry contractors, brought suit as an indirect purchaser against various manufacturers of concrete blocks that had engaged in illegal price fixing. 24
The Court held that an indirect purchaser, or a purchaser that has the
monopoly price "passed-on" to it, could not recover antitrust claims
against an alleged antitrust violator. 25
B.

The Policy Supporting the Rule of Illinois Brick and Recognized
Exceptions
"[AJ little slopover on the shoulders of the wrongdoers. . .. We do
not find this risk acceptable. »26

The Illinois Brick Court looked to several policy reasons in crafting a
rule that prevented both an indirect purchaser claim and an indirect
purchaser defense. 27 One of the Court's concerns was an "unwillingness to complicate treble-damages actions" with complex accounting
data and calculations in an already complex litigation. 28 Inherent in
this concern was the difficulty calculating whether the indirect purchaser had actually received the full monopoly price increase when it
purchased the consumer good from the direct purchaser. 29 If the direct purchaser absorbed either partially or completely, any portion of
the monopoly overcharge, then damages to the indirect purchaser
would be lower or disappear altogether. 3o Thus, a direct purchaser's

23.
24.
25.
26.

27.

28.
29.

30.

an antitrust lawsuit with a direct purchaser. See Kassis, supra note 19, at
1098-99.
431 U.S. 720.
Id.
Id. at 736, 745-47.
Id. at 731 n.ll.
Id. at 751 (Brennan, j., dissenting). The indirect purchaser defense is
equivalent to a "defensive passing-on" of costs; likewise, the indirect purchaser claim is equivalent to an "offensive passing-on" of costs. Id. at 750
n.5; see also Jerry L. Beane, Passing-On Revived: An Antitrust Dilemma, 32 BAYLOR L. REv. 347, 363-64 (1980) (discussing the theory behind "offensive"
and "defensive passing-on").
Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 725.
Id. at 732-33 n.13. The Court in Hanover Shoe, Inc. explained that "[a] wide
range offactors influence a company's pricin~ policies." 392 U.S. 481, 492
(1968). Even if the actual cost calculations 'in the real economic world"
could determine that any pricing change was a result of passing-on the monopoly charge to indirect consumers, it would be nearly impossible to
prove that the direct purchaser would not have raised its prices absent the
monopoly charge. Id. at 493. In fact, the Court in Hanover Shoe believed
that such a showing was "virtually unascertainable" and "the task would normally prove insurmountable." Id.
Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1170 (8th Cir. 1998).
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claim would be less complicated and a more efficient use of judicial
and private resources. 31
In order to place the act of recognizing damages for an indirect
purchaser in perspective, it is helpful to recognize the "relative ease"
in which a direct purchaser may prove damages. Mter a judicial determination of an antitrust violation, a direct purchaser must have "proof
of some damage."32 In turn, damages are calculated by the finder of
fact to a lesser standard of approximation and subsequently trebled. 33
Of course, a direct purchaser plaintiff lacking direct evidence of an
antitrust violation must rely on expert witnesses. A direct purchaser's
evidentiary threshold for using an expert witness is controlled largely
by a judicial determination of the expert's scientific foundation based
on Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael. 34
The Court's second reason for barring an indirect purchaser defense and its concomitant indirect purchaser claim was because excluding a direct purchaser from antitrust litigation would decrease the
deterrent effect of antitrust laws. 35 For example, in Hanover Shoe,
United Shoe was barred from showing that Hanover had passed-on
the monopoly overcharge to the ultimate consumer, or indirect purchaser. 36 Assuming that United could prove that Hanover had passed
31. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 732-33 & n.13.
32. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 114 & n.9
(1969) (holding that "proof of some damage" from illegal conspiracy of
overseas patent pools was enough to show a compensable injury under § 4
of the Clayton Act for a damages determination); Bigelow v. RKO Radio
Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946) (holding that a showing of some
damage, even when not specific, from an unlawful violation of federal antitrust laws was sufficient to support a treble-damages verdict).
33. Bigelow, 327 U.S. at 264. RKO explained several examples where plaintiffs'
approximation of damages were inexact, yet sufficient for a reasonable jury
to calculate treble damages. Id. at 263-64. Part of the Court's holding included recognition that RKO and its co-defendants' "wrongful action had
prevented [plaintiffs] from making any more precise proof of the amount
of damage." Id. at 266.
34. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). The Court in Kumho Tire explained that the "standard
of evidentiary reliability" of any expert witness is controlled largely by the
judicial analysis performed in Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., Inc. See id. at
149 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993)). The Court in Daubert held
that the trial judge's determinations may be guided by at least four factors:
(1) "[w]hether a theory or technique ... has been tested"; (2) "[w]hether it
'has been subjected to peer review"'; (3) "[w]hether it has a 'known or
potential rate of error"'; and (4) "[w]hether it enjoys 'general acceptance.'" Id. at 149-50 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-94). Maryland courts
would probably apply a similar standard for an economic expert in an antitrust claim. See Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. 634, 650, 770 A.2d 152, 161
(2001) .
35. See Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481,494 (1968).
An indirect purchaser defense would be implicit in allowing a right by indirect purchasers to file antitrust claims for treble damages. Id.
36. Id. at 493-94. The debate over to what extent a direct purchaser passes-on
the monopoly overcharge continues today. See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. This debate between economic models was exactly the type
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the exact amount of the monopoly overcharge to the indirect consumer, an indirect purchaser defense would render Hanover's trebledamage claim useless, as they would have suffered no actual
damages. 37
If Hanover Shoe, the direct purchaser, was barred from a claim by
an indirect purchaser passing-on defense (assuming a penny for
penny pass-on of the monopoly overcharge), indirect purchasers
themselves "would have only a tiny stake in the lawsuit and hence little
incentive to sue."38 Even if some of the smaller indirect purchasers
were to succeed in their antitrust claims, in spite of the daunting cost
of antitrust litigation, the deterrent effect of treble damages to a small
claim would be considerably weaker than the treble-damages award
from the direct purchaser that bore the full brunt of the alleged monopoly price increase. 39 Without a significant incentive for an injured
party to sue, the Court feared that the alleged antitrust violator would
maintain its monopoly profit, legally protected by the indirect purchaser defense against the wholly damaged direct purchaser, and insulated against the significantly smaller claims by the indirect purchaser
plain tiffs. 40
The Court's third concern was to protect antitrust defendants from
the risk of multiple awards for one liability. 41 In Illinois Brick,

37.
38.

39.
40.

4l.

of accounting complexity that Hanover Shoe sought to avoid. Hanover Shoe,
Inc., 392 U.S.at 492-93.
See id. at 493.
Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 725-26 (citing Hanover Shoe, Inc., 392 U.S. at 494).
In theory, this "tiny stake" would be the actual damages suffered by the
individual consumer, which could be estimated on a per unit basis as the
amount of the monopoly overcharge per unit passed-on by the direct purchaser (assuming such a calculation could be performed) and multiplied
by the number of units the indirect purchaser actually purchased. While it
would be inevitable that private party indirect purchasers, if they were able,
would seek class certification, it brings the added difficulty of class certification in indirect purchaser lawsuits. See generally Chris S. Coutroulis & D.
Matthew Allen, The Pass-on Problem in Indirect Purchaser Class Litigation, 44
ANTITRUST BULL. 179, 184-86 (Spring 1999). It is enough to acknowledge
that a significant number of lawsuits from indirect purchaser plaintiffs in an
Illinois Brick repealer state are defeated through a denial of class certification. See id. at 187; see also William H. Page, The Limits of State Indirect Purchaser Suits: Class Certification in the Shadow of Illinois Brick, 67 ANTITRUST
LJ. 1, 13 (1999).
Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 734.
See Hanover Shoe, Inc., 392 U.S. at 494. The overall deterrent effect of antitrust laws relies on four prongs of enforcement: the DOj, the FTC, state
attorneys general, and private parties, all bringing potential antitrust lawsuits against alleged antitrust violators. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw, POLICY AND PROCEDURE 69 (4th ed. 1999).
Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 730. Some scholars hypothesize that trial judges
are less likely to find liability for any indirect purchaser treble-damage antitrust claim, therefore reducing the liability rather than the amount of the
damages awarded. See, e.g., Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust "Treble" Damages
Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO ST. LJ. 115, 163 (1993).
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"[p]rivate treble-damages actions brought by the masonry contractors,
general contractors, and private builders were settled, without
prejudice to [Illinois'] lawsuit."42 If direct purchasers were allowed to
recover for the full amount of the overcharge for the monopoly price,
then the indirect purchasers might be able to recover the same
amount from the defendant absent a legal bar to their claim. 43 Lastly,
the Court recognized that procedural devices would be ineffective in
preventing this possible multiple liability, especially when potential
parties had either received judgment or settlement in advance. 44
Before Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick, the Court had generally interpreted § 4 of the Clayton Act to protect all victims of antitrust violations. 45 In Hanover Shoe and Illinois Brick, however, the Court
determined that neither the defensive use of "passing-on" in Hanover
Shoe, nor the offensive use of "passing-on" were permitted. These rulings effectively limited an alleged antitrust violator's litigation liability
to its immediate purchasers. 46 The most prevailing reasons for an
equal bar to a passing-on defense and a passing-on claim were the
uncertainties and complexities the courts would face in accounting
for damages to both direct purchasers and the amount of the overcharge passed onto indirect purchasers without overlapping liabilities
to the defendant. 47
This same complexity in litigation was a significant factor preventing Illinois Brick from abandoning altogether the rule of Hanover
Shoe. 48 While the Court deferred somewhat to stare decisis in refusing
to overturn Hanover Shoe,49 the main reason for expanding Hanover
Shoe to limit offensive use of passing-on was to prevent "whole new
dimensions of complexity" to treble-damage lawsuits and increasing
judicial economy. 50
42. Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 727 n.5.
43. Id. at 730. The converse of this would also be true. Id. If the indirect

44.

45.
46.

47.
48.
49.

50.

purchaser was able to recover all, or part, of the monopoly overcharge
before the direct purchaser, then the direct purchaser might be able to
recover the full amount of the monopoly charge and the defendant would
incur the multiple liability. Id.
Id. at 731 n.ll. The impact of settled antitrust cases on damages awards
cannot be underestimated. One study conducted on over 2,350 antitrust
cases filed between 1973 and 1983, in five district courts, found that almost
three-fourths of the private party antitrust lawsuits settled. Steven C. Salop
& Lawrence J. White, Economic Analysis of Private Party Antitrust Litigation, 74
CEO. LJ. 1001, 1010 (1986).
See Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 729,748; see also supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
See Beane, supra note 27, at 363.
Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 731 n.ll.
Id. at 737-38.
Id. at 736-37.
Id. at 737. The Court feared both the complexity of the accounting and the
complexity of bringing all of the potential plaintiffs through joinder, rendering private antitrust enforcement ineffective. See id. at 739-40. For a
discussion of the economic complexities supporting Illinois Brick, see Wil-
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The Court also suggested two exceptions to Illinois Brick that lower
courts have embraced to varying degrees. 51 A cost-plus exception exists for those indirect purchaser plaintiffs that purchase products
under a fixed mark-up, fixed quantity contract negotiated prior to the
alleged monopoly price increase. 52 The second exception occurs
"where the direct purchaser is owned or controlled by its customer."53

C.

The Illinois Brick Repealers
But the ruling in Illinois Brick creates a situation equally or even
more unfair. It permits the middleman to collect twice-to reap the
profits of overcharges from the consumer, and then to charge the
manufacturer for the illegality. And it leaves the one party injured
in fact-the consumer-wholly uncompensated. 54

The congressional backlash to Illinois Brick's interpretation of the
Clayton Act was quick, but ineffective. Justice White's request to Congress to amend § 4 of the Clayton Act55 went effectively unanswered. 56
State legislatures and state appellate courts were more receptive to
"repealing"57 Illinois Brick in applications of their respective state anti-

51.
52.
53.

54.

55.

56.
57.

liam M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Indirect Purchasers Have Standing to Sue Under the Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis of the Rule of Illinois
Brick, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 602 (1979); but see Harris & Sullivan, supra note 3.
Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 735.
Id. at 733 n.12, 735-36.
Id. at 736 n.16. Davidson's claim had hoped to fall under either of these
exceptions but failed. See infra note 103. For a synopsis of these exceptions, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales,
103 HARv. L. REv. 1717, 1718-20 (1990).
125 CONGo REc. 1459 (1979) (statement of Sen. E. Kennedy). Legal and
business scholars agree that "it is virtually certain that no part of the [antitrust damages] award will find its way to the indirect purchasers who bore
part or all of the offensive price increase." Harris & Sullivan, supra note 3,
at 298.
Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 733 n.14. Senator Kennedy and Congressman
Rodino introduced legislation to repeal the Court's holding in Illinois Brick
in 1978 and 1979, but failed to have their bills passed by Congress. Harris
& Sullivan, supra note 3, at 271-72. The Illinois Brick ruling may have been a
particularly bitter pill for Congressman Rodino, co-sponsor of the HartScott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, 15 U.S.c. § 15(c)
(1976), when Justice White effectively rendered the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act
useless in interpreting a private party's cause of action as an indirect purchaser because of its "unclear intent" concerning the passing-on issues present in Hanover Shoe. See Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 733 n.14; see also 122
CONGo REc. 30883 (1976) (statement of Rep. Flowers).
For a list of federal circuit courts and cases that authorized indirect purchasers in an antitrust treble-damage claim and were subsequently overruled, see Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 754 n.lO.
Federal antitrust laws, based on the Commerce Clause, Article I, Section 8
of the Constitution, are not repealed by an act of state sovereignty. Rather,
the" Illinois Brick repealer" is a subtle misnomer; the Illinois Brick repealers
simply allow a cause of action to indirect purchasers pursuant to state anti-
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trust statutes. Since Illinois Brick, several states have generally allowed
some type of indirect purchaser claims for damages pursuant to state
antitrust or consumer protection laws. 58
For purposes of this discussion, states allowing indirect purchasers
an antitrust cause of action for damages generally fall into one of two
categories. 59 The first category of states are those with explicit repealer statutes. An explicit Illinois Brick repealer statute will generally
allow indirect purchasers to bring claims for plaintiffs in one, or any
combination of the following: (1) state and political subdivisions as
indirect purchasers; (2) state attorney generals as parens patriae on behalf of citizens that are indirect purchasers; and (3) private party indirect purchasers. 6o
These explicit repealer statutes survived judicial scrutiny in ARC
America when the Supreme Court held that Illinois Brick did not preempt state antitrust laws allowing claims from indirect purchasers. 61

58.

59.

60.

61.

trust law where a similar claim under federal law would be barred and
where federal statutes do not preempt state law. See infra notes 61-68 and
accompanying text.
See Kevin]. O'Connor, Is the Illinois Brick Wall Crumbling?, 15 ANTITRUST 34,
34-35 (2001); see also Greene et aI., supra note 3, at 1153-55.
Professor O'Connor actually describes three categories of indirect purchaser actions for damages: (1) by, or on behalf of, indirect purchasers; (2)
on behalf of state indirect purchasers; and (3) on behalf of consumers,
under either consumer protection or unfair trade practices laws.
O'Connor, supra note 58, at 34-35. In comparison, Professor Page preferred categorizing indirect purchaser suits into two broad categories: (1)
states that allow indirect purchaser suits with explicit Illinois Brick repealers;
and (2) states that allow indirect purchaser claims based on antitrust or
consumer protection statutes predating the Illinois Brick decision. Page,
supra note 38, at 2.
See Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 733 n.12, 735-36. For an example of a statute
with Illinois Brick repealers through consumer protection laws, see CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 35-32, 35-35 (1997) (allowing the Attorney General to "bring
an action ... as ... parens patriae for persons residing in the state" and
"[ t] he state ... shall recover treble damages"). For examples of states with
complete explicit Illinois Brick repealers, see ALA. CODE § 6-5-60(a) (1993)
(allowing recovery by "[a]ny person ... injured or damaged ... direct or
indirect"); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16750(a) (West 1997) (allowing recovery "regardless of whether such injured person dealt directly or indirectly with the defendant"); MINN. STAT. § 325D.57 (1995) (allowing
recovery by any person "injured directly or indirectly"); and MISS. CODE
ANN. § 75-21-9 (1999) ("any person ... injured or damaged ... direct or
indirect") .
490 U.S. 93, 103 (1989) (holding that state indirect purchaser statutes were
not preempted because Illinois Brick was an interpretation of § 4 of the Clayton Act and as such has no bearing on the availability of recovery to indirect
private purchasers under state antitrust laws). It is an item of antitrust trivia
that Justice White authored Hanover Shoe, Illino~ Brick, and ARC America,
explicitly barring a federal indirect passing-on defense and offense, and
permitting states the opportunity to create such indirect defensive and offensive passing-on rights. Id. at 103; see also Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 735-36;
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 488
(1968) .
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In ARC America, appellant California sought treble damages as an indirect purchaser pursuant to the establishment of a settlement fund in a
cement antitrust class action. 62 The trial court and the Ninth Circuit
held that the direct purchasers, including ARC America, should receive the distribution of the $32 million settlement fund because indirect purchasers were barred from recovery under Illinois Brick. 63 The
Ninth Circuit further reiterated the three purposes behind Illinois
Brick as follows: "avoiding unnecessarily complicated litigation; providing direct purchasers with incentives to bring private antitrust actions;
and avoiding multiple liability of defendants."64
In overturning the Ninth Circuit, the Court explained that Illinois
Brick was merely ajudicial interpretation of the Clayton Act, not a "decision defining the interrelationship between the federal and state antitrust laws."65 Because federal antitrust laws like the Sherman and
Clayton Acts were created to allow federal antitrust law to supplement
existing state antitrust statutes and common law,66 there was neither
express preemption by Congress nor an "obstacle to the accomplishment" of Congress' objectives by enforcing a seemingly contrary state
antitrust statutory scheme. 51 Lastly, the Court explained that indirect
purchaser claims pursuant to state antitrust laws would have no effect
on lessening the incentive of direct purchasers in pursuing their federal claims in federal courts. 68
The second category of states repealing Illinois Brick are those states
that recognize indirect purchasers having an antitrust cause of action
in their existing antitrust statutes. 69 These state appellate courts sim62. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 97-99.
63. Id. at 99.
64. Id. (citing In re Cement & Concrete Antitrust Litig., 817 F.2d 1435, 1445
(9th Cir. 1987».
65. Id. at 105.
66. See id. at 102 (interpreting 21 CONGo REc. 2457 (1890) (remarks of Sen.
Sherman»; see also MORRIS D. FORKOSCH, ANTITRUST AND THE CONSUMER,
32-170 (1956) (analyzing the legislative history of the Sherman Act).
67. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. at 102. The Court further explained that state
antitrust laws achieved the same purpose as federal antitrust laws; "deterring anticompetitive conduct and ensuring compensation of victims of that
conduct." Id.
68. Id. at 104. Some scholars attribute the decision in ARC America as a victory
for Reagan Federalism. For a recent article addressing this topic, see Donald I. Baker, Federalism & Futility: Hitting the Potholes on the Illinois Brick
Road, 17 ANTITRUST 14 (2002).
69. See generally Bunker's Glass Co. v. Pilkington PLC, 47 P.3d 1119 (Ariz. Ct.
App.2002) (interpreting section 44-1408 of the 1994 Arizona Revised Statutes to include a cause of action for indirect purchasers without explicit
statutory language repealing Illinois Brick); Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 646
N.W.2d 440 (Iowa 2002) (interpreting section 553.12 of the 1997 Iowa
Code to include a cause of action for all purchasers, including indirect purchasers, without explicit statutory language repealing Illinois Brick and despite legislative directive to be guided by federal antitrust interpretations);
Hyde v. Abbot Labs., 473 S.E.2d 680 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996) (interpreting
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ply interpret seemingly ambiguous state antitrust statutes as including
all purchasers, including indirect purchasers.
D.

The Maryland Antitrust Acfo
"It is the intent of the General Assembly that, in construing this subtitle, the courts be guided by the interpretation given by the federal
courts to the various federal statutes dealing with the same or similar
matters . . . . ,J7l

In 1972, the Maryland General Assembly enacted House Bill No.1,
the MATA, which is codified at sections 11-201 to 11-213 of the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland Code. 72 The MATA was the first
explicit statutory regulation of antitrust activity under Article 41 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights. 73
Section 11-202 of the Maryland Commercial Code states the general
purpose and construction of the MATA.74 Three provisions of this
section are relevant to the discussion of Davidson.
First, the General Assembly "declares that the purpose of this subtitle is to com~lement the body of federal law governing restraints of
trade . . . . " 5 When this guidance is coupled with the Supreme
Court's view of federal antitrust law in ARC America, namely that fed-

70.

71.
72.
73.

74.
75.

section 75-16 of the 1990 North Carolina General Statutes to include indirect purchasers without an explicit directive because the Rule of Illinois
Brick did not exist when the statute was drafted in 1969). But see Major v.
Microsoft Corp., 60 P.3d 511, 513 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002) (interpreting section 205 of the 2002 Oklahoma Antitrust Reform Act, allowing "any person
who is injured," as consistent with federal antitrust laws and thus precluding an indirect purchaser claim).
The MATA refers to both the original legislation and the current antitrust
statute. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-213 (2000). This comment will
refer to both the original 1972 act, as codified in 1975, and the current
statute as the MATA; however, references to the 1975 statute that have been
amended or changed will be cited accordingly. Likewise, the MATA provisions that have remained unchanged since 1972 will be cited to the 2000
code.
Id. § 11-202 (emphasis added).
William L. Reynolds, II & James B. Wright, A Practitioner's Guide to the Maryland Antitrust Act, 36 MD. L. REv. 323, 323 & n.2 (1976).
Id. at 323. "[M]onopolies are odious, contrary to the spirit of free government and the principles of commerce, and ought not to be suffered." MD.
CaNST. art. 41. Despite this historic first codification of Maryland's constitutional antitrust powers, there were no reported private actions under the
MATA during its first four years of existence. Reynolds & Wright, supra
note 72, at 349. In comparison, three cases touching the MATA, including
Davidson v. Microsoft, have been reported between 1999 and 2002. See Martello v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Md., Inc., 143 Md. App. 462, 795 A.2d
185 (2002); Davidson II, 143 Md. App. 43, 792 A.2d 336 (2002); Electronics
Store, Inc. v. Cellco P'ship, 127 Md. App. 385, 732 A.2d 980 (1999).
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-202.
Id. § 11-202(a)(I).
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eral antitrust laws were designed to complement existing state and
common law antitrust laws, it creates a curious statutory interpretation
scheme similar to the "chicken-egg" truism. 76 If a deciding court were
to interpret an ambiguous Maryland antitrust law, it would be guided
by section 11-202 (a) (1) to interpret the law as complementing existing federal law. 77 Under ARC America, those same federal statutory
interpretations would be guided by legislative history from 1890,
which indicates that federal antitrust laws merely "supplement, not
displace, state antitrust remedies."78 In turn, if the antitrust issue was
sufficiently ambiguous within the statute, this federal interpretation
could lead the court back to 1867 and the Maryland Declaration of
Rights for a common law solution, if one existed.
Second, section 11-202(a) (2) states that courts should be "guided
by the interpretations given by the federal courts to the various federal statutes dealing with the same or similar matters . . . . "79 This
same section also explicitly lists the Clayton Act as one of the federal
statutes to "guide" the Maryland courts. 80 Within six years of the passage of the MATA, this guidance was held to be only persuasive, not
binding, for interpreting Maryland antitrust statutes. 81
Lastly, section 11-201 lists an additional consideration for a court in
interpreting its statutory language. Section 11-201 (b) provides "this
subtitle shall be liberally construed to serve its beneficial purposes."82
In civil antitrust lawsuits, section 11-209 of the 1975 Maryland Commercial Code created causes of actions for both the state and for "a
person."83 Subsection (b) (1) pertained explicitly to the United States,
the state, and political subdivisions of the state, while subsection
(b) (2) controlled lawsuits by private parties. 84 In the original MATA,
76. "Which came first, the chicken or the egg?" See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
77. See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-202(a)(1).
78. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 (1989). See supra notes 61-68
and accompanying text.
79. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-202(a)(2).
80. Id.
81. Quality Disc. Tires v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 282 Md. 7, 12,382 A.2d
867,870 (1978) (holding that section 11-202(a)(2) of the Commercial Law
Article of the Maryland Code advises a court "[to] be guided (but not
bound) by the opinions of the federal courts under the federal antitrust
laws" in determining the legal standard for a resale price maintenance
claim under Maryland law). But see State v. Jonathan Logan, Inc., 301 Md.
63, 66-67, 482 A.2d 1, 2 (1984) (explaining that § 4 of the Sherman Act is
"analogous" to section 11-209(a) of the Commercial Law Article of the Maryland Code).
82. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-202(b) (1).
83. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw § 11-209(b) (1975) (amended 1982).
84. Id. Compare "[t]he United States, the State, and any political subdivision
organized under the authority of the State is a person having standing to
bring an action under this subsection" with "[a] person whose business or
property has been iryured or threatened with injury by a violation of [section] 11-204 may maintain an action for damages or for an injunction or
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there is no explicit mention of either a direct purchaser or indirect
purchaser cause of action. 85
Mter Illinois Brick, the Maryland General Assembly amended the
MATA in 1982, explicitly allowing the state and its agencies to bring
claims as indirect purchasers pursuant to Maryland law. 86 This partial
Illinois Brick repealer made no mention of either allowing or preventing private individual indirect claims for treble damages. While Maryland remained guided by federal antitrust jurisprudence in
accordance with section 11-202 (a)(2) of the MATA,87 this "guidance"
left the Maryland antitrust law ambiguous and open to interpretation
for indirect purchaser antitrust claims made by private parties. s8
IV.

THE

INSTANT

CASE:

DAVIDSON V.

MICROSOFI'

COR-

PORATION
"(AJppellee had engaged in business practices in violation ojJederal
antitrust laws. '89
A.

Factual and Procedural Analysis oJDavidson

In March 2000, Bobby Davidson and Tri-County Industries, two unrelated plaintiffs, brought suit against the Microsoft Corporation in
the Circuit Court for Prince George's County on behalf of a class of
Maryland consumers pursuant to the MATA. 90 Both Mr. Davidson
and Tri-County had purchased computers in 1999 containing
Microsoft Windows 98 software. 91 Both had also registered the owner-

85.
86.
87.
88.

89.
90.
91.

both against any person who has committed the violation." [d. Title 11
defines a person as "an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust,
partnership, association, two or more persons having a joint or common
interest, or any other legal or commercial entity." MD. CODE ANN., COM.
LAw II § 11-201(f) (2000).
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw § 11-209(b) (1975) (amended 1982).
MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-209(b)(2) (ii) (2000). See sUfrra note 6
and accompanying text.
See sUfrra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
See MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-202 (a) (2). See generally 6 JULIAN O.
VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAws & TRADE REGULATION § 120.08[1] [e] (2d
ed. 2003) (noting that, before Davidson, private party indirect purchaser
claims for damages were probably barred in Maryland).
Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 46, 792 A.2d at 338.
[d. at 45, 792 A.2d at 338; Davidson I, 2001 WL 514369, at *l.
Davidson I, 2001 WL 514369, at *l. The plaintiffs subsequently amended
their complaint on January 26,2001 to include a claim under the Maryland
Consumer Protection Act alleging that Microsoft "failed to inform the
plaintiffs that it was a monopoly and that it had illegally set the price of
Windows 98." [d. at *2. The trial court later held that there was no such
violation and dismissed this claim. [d. The court of special appeals later
unanimously affirmed this dismissal in Davidson II. 143 Md. App. at 57,792
A.2d at 345.
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ship of that software with Microsoft in accordance with the corporation's End-User License Agreement ("EULA").92
Concurrent with the Maryland antitrust claim was a similar action in
the United States District Court for the District of Maryland. Pursuant
to federal antitrust laws regarding the Microsoft operating system
software and its interference with Java technology, Internet Web
browsers, and office software applications, Judge Frederick Motz consolidated sixty-one claims against Microsoft. 93
The plaintiffs' memorandum opposing both Microsoft's Motion to
Dismiss and Motion for Summary Judgment specified the importance
of the EULA between Microsoft and the end-user. 94 These EULAs
were described as "take it or leave it" propositions that must be entered when the end-user first "chooses" to use the software. 95 The
court stated that these contracts transfer a user license to the enduser; neither the end-user nor the original equipment manufacturer
("OEM") ever purchase or receive title to the software during the
transaction. 96
Judge Motz's decision dismissed all of the claims brought by indirect purchasers pursuant to Illinois Brick. 97 Although the plaintiffs did
not directly purchase the software from Microsoft, they alleged that
the actual product purchased was the EULA, which "ran directly between Microsoft and themselves."98 The court acknowledged that,
while the EULA was a licensing agreement directly between Microsoft
and the consumer, the actual purchase of this perpetual license of the
operating system software occurred between Microsoft and the OEM,
and then between the OEM and the consumer. 99
On February 14, 2001, the trial court in Davidson I dismissed the
MATA claim. lOo The trial court explained that Maryland had "cho92. Davidson I, 2001 WL 514369, at *l.
93. In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 127 F. Supp. 2d 702, 704-08 (D. Md.
2001). As a result of the federal criminal antitrust lawsuit showing that
Microsoft had exercised illegal monopoly power in violation of § 2 of the
Sherman Act, seventy-three antitrust cases against Microsoft were not consolidated in Judge Motz's court because they provided no basis for federal
jurisdiction. Id. at 705 n.l. Fifty-eight of those cases were pending at the
time of Judge Motz's decision. Id.
94. Id. at 705-06.
95. Id. at 706.
96. Id. In fact, the OEM's sole function in the EULA is merely to deliver the
EULA to the end-user; the OEMs have a separate license with Microsoft
allowing them to pre-install Microsoft software on their computers. Id. at
705-06.
97. Id. at 709-13.
98. Id. at 709.
99. Id. Judge Motz's opinion also discussed claims of foreign parties, plaintiffs'
motion for remand, dismissal of some antitrust claims under their respective state laws, and an order certifying his decision for an interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292. Id. at 705.
100. Davidson 1,2001 WL 514369, at *2.
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sen" to "conform" the MATA to federal law in accordance with section
11-202 of the Maryland Commercial Code. 101 In turn, the court held
that end-users, like Mr. Davidson and Tri-County, were indirect purchasers, in spite of the "direct" EULA between Microsoft and the
plaintiffs. l02 Because there was no explicit mention of an Illinois Brick
repealer for private indirect purchasers, and section 11-209 (b) (1) did
provide a state indirect purchaser claim, the trial court held that the
Rule of Illinois Brick barred the plaintiffs' claim.103

B.

Legal Analysis of Davidson

The issue before the court in Davidson II was limited to the statutory
construction of sections 11-202 and 11-209 of the MATA. I04 Judge
James Eyler's majority opinion interpreted the guidance of section 11202(a) (2) as a directive: "courts are to be guided by the interpretation
given by federal courts to the various federal statutes dealing with the
same or similar matters." I 05 While the majority buttressed its interpretation of section 11-209 with other arguments, its main argument
rested in its view of federal precedent as binding through section 11202.106
In interpreting section 11-202, the majority relied on State v.
jonathan Logan, Inc., a state antitrust lawsuit regarding a resale price
maintenance conspiracy in raincoats. 107 The court in jonathan Logan,
Inc. interpreted section 11-209(a)(2) of the Commercial Code and
held that an equity court could not award disgorgement where the
statute was silent to that specific remedy. lOS Where the statute is silent, jonathan Logan, Inc. further explained, it should be guided by
federal interpretations of the federal statutory analog in accordance
with the policy of section 11-202.109 Because analogous federal antitrust laws did not permit an equity judgment under an analogous statute, neither did the MATA. IIO
Judge Sonner's dissent in Davidson II discounted the majority's interpretation of section 11-202 and reliance on jonathan Logan, Inc. lII
Judge Sonner explained that the majority erroneously interpreted the
101. Id. at *1. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
102. Davidson I, 2001 WL 514369, at *2.
103. Id. at *1. Judge Lamasney also held that neither of the two Illinois Brick
exceptions-a cost plus contract or ownership of the direct purchaserapplied. [d. at *2. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text for more
analysis of these exceptions.
104. See Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 49-51, 792 A.2d at 340-41.
105. Id. at 50, 792 A.2d at 340-41 (citing MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11202(a) (2) (2000». See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
106. See Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 50-51, 792 A.2d at 340-41.
107. 301 Md. 63, 64,482 A.2d 1, 1 (1984).
108. See id. at 70-76, 482 A.2d at 4-8.
109. Id. at 75, 482 A.2d at 7.
110. See id.
111. Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 63-64,792 A.2d at 348-49.
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guidance in section 11-202 as binding, rather than as a permissive inference as described in Quality Discount Tires v. Firestone Tire. 112 He
further explained that where the MATA may be ambiguous, Maryland
courts are free to interpret the statute contrary to federallaw. 113
The majority continued its analysis of section 11-209(b).1l4 While it
stated that" [a] person ... may maintain an action for damages," the
statute made no explicit mention of private parties as indirect purchasers. 115 Next, the court defined a person as "an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, association, two or
more persons .... "116 The court held that this definition did "not
purport to address the Illinois Brick issue."117 Thus, the majority held
that the MATA was sufficiently ambiguous to require guidance from
federal interpretations of Illinois Brick. 1IS
The maJority further buttressed its argument with evidence of indirect legislative history. 11 9 In 1981, the Maryland General Assembly
failed to pass an explicit Illinois Brick repealer statute for all plaintiffS.120 In 1982, section 11-209(b)(2) was amended, allowing the state
and its agencies to bring indirect purchaser lawsuits, but was silent as
to private parties. 121
The court also mentioned Senate Bill 484, which was drafted in
2001 to explicitly allow a cause of action for indirect purchasers. 122
The court explained in dicta that the bill's introduction and subsequent defeat in the Senate Judicial Committee by a six-to-five vote indicated that there was no recognition of a private party indirect
purchaser claim in the MATA. 123
While the majority recognized that its reliance on Senate Bill 484's
defeat was dicta, its reliance on Senate Bill 484 is further weakened in
that it failed to explain that Senate Bill 484 also proposed more than a
mere Illinois Brick repealer. 124 Senate Bill 484 actually proposed two
changes to the MATA. 125 First, it specifically proposed the repeal of
the Rule of Illinois Brick for private party indirect purchasers. 126 Sec112. Id. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
113. Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 61, 792 A.2d at 347 (citing Greenbelt Homes,
Inc. v. Nyman Realty, Inc., 48 Md. App. 42, 48, 426 A.2d 394, 398 (1981)).
114. Id. at 49, 792 A.2d at 340.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 50, 792 A.2d at 340 (explaining MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11201(f) (2000)). See supra note 84.
117. Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 50,792 A.2d at 340.
lIB. See id. at 50-51, 56, 792 A.2d at 340-41, 344.
119. Id. at 51, 792 A.2d at 34l.
120. Id.
12l. Id. See supra notes 8~8 and accompanying text.
122. Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 51 & n.4, 792 A.2d at 341 & n.4; S. 484, 2001
Leg., 415th Sess. (Md. 2001).
123. Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 51 & n.4, 792 A.2d at 341 & n.4.
124. Id.
125. S. 484, 2001 Leg., 415th Sess. (Md. 2001).
126. Id.
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ond, it proposed to overturn jonathan Logan, Inc. and explicitly allow
the Attorney General to bring a farens patriae action for damages on
behalf of Maryland consumers.12
The court concluded its opinion with a brief explanation of the
guiding policies of the Rule of Illinois Brick. 128 Judge James Eyler's
majority opinion specifically cited the concern addressed in Hanover
Shoe regarding the "massive evidence and complicated theories" involved in calculating the actual overcharge passed-on to the consumer/indirect purchaser. 129 Satisfied that the circuit court's holding
met both the legal doctrine and the relevant public policy of Illinois
Brick, the court of special appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal
of the indirect purchaser's antitrust claim. 130
In contrast, Judge Sonner countered the maJority's policy argument
behind Illinois Brick concerning the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement through private party lawsuits. 131 Normally, direct purchasers,
by virtue that they faced both the entire monopoly price and suffered
the largest monopoly damages, have the greatest incentive to bring a
complex, expensive antitrust lawsuit. 132 With the advent of internet
browsers and modern personal computers, Judge Sonner recognized
that there had been a fundamental change of circumstances since Illinois Brick in 1977. 133 When software direct purchasers have a greater
incentive to sell the monopoly product at the monopoly price, and the
indirect purchasers are estopped by a judicial bar, there is no private
party entering antitrust litigation and thus, no deterrent effect. 134
After countering the majority's interpretation of both section 11202 and the policy behind Illinois Brick, the dissent argued that claims
by indirect purchasers were permitted within section 11_209. 135 Recognizing that the MATA section 11-209 serves the "same purpose" as
the Clayton Act, 136 Judge Sonner explained that section 11-209 purports no explicit distinction between a "person" as a direct or indirect
purchaser in an antitrust claim. 137
Judge Sonner turned to statutory construction to determine the legislature's intent, stating that "there is no ambiguity, and we may not
127. Id.
128. Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 47-50, 792 A.2d at 339-40. See supra Part II.A-B.
129. Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 48-49,792 A.2d at 340 (citing Ill. Brick Co., 431
U.S. 720, 741 (1977) (explaining Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach.
Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968»). See supra notes 27-53 and accompanying text.
130. Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 56-57, 792 A.2d at 344-45.
131. Id. at 57-64, 792 A.2d at 345-48 (Sonner, j., dissenting).
132. See id. at 61 n.2, 792 A.2d at 347 n.2 (citing Hanover Shoe, Inc., 392 U.S. at
494).
133. Id. at 59, 792 A.2d at 346.
134. See id; supra note 40 and accompanying text (describing the four prongs of
antitrust deterrence).
135. Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 59-63, 792 A.2d at 346-48.
136. Id. at 60, 792 A.2d at 346.
137. Id. at 62, 792 A.2d at 348.
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find one where none exists."138 The statutory purpose of the MATA,
pursuant to section 11-202, is "to protect the public and foster fair and
honest intrastate competition."139 The Maryland General Assembly
recommended a liberal construction 140 "that harmonizes the general
scheme of the statute."141 Lastly, Judge Sonner warned the majority
that statutory construction should rely on the General Assembly's actions, not the General Assembly's failure to act in not explicitly providing for an indirect purchaser remedy.142
Judge Sonner concluded his argument with the holding in ARC
America that federal antitrust law had not preempted the field of state
antitrust law. 143 Recognizing that state antitrust law was not preempted by federal law, Judge Sonner cited several jurisdictions that,
pursuant to state antitrust law, allowed claims by an indirect purchaser
in cases where the indirect purchaser provisions were ambiguous. 144

V.

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS REVEALS THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF ILLINOIS BRICK
"[T] his Court has reconsidered its decisions construing the Sherman
Act when the theoretical underpinnings of those decisions are called
into serious question. "145

The court of special appeals failed to reach the economic underpinnings of the Rule of Illinois Brick in Davidson. Relying on a quartercentury old legal principle in an area of law significantly influenced by
economic theory, Maryland's first reported decision embraces the
Rule of Illinois Brick where it is not explicitly repealed. 146 As such,
private persons, as indirect purchasers, are legally barred from damage claims pursuant to the MATA.147 While indirect purchasers can
138. Id. "We must apply principles of construction that render a common sense
reading of statutory terms in light of the overriding purpose and goal of the
statute." Id. (citing Haigley v. Dept. of Health & Mental Hygiene, 128 Md.
App. 194, 222, 736 A.2d 1185, 1200 (1999) (quoting Martin v. Beverage
Capital Corp., 353 Md. 388, 399, 726 A.2d 728,734 (1999»).
139. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-202(a)(l) (2000».
140. Id. (quoting MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-202(b)(I».
141. Id. (citing Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 1l5, 125, 48 A.2d 754, 759
(1946» .
142. Id. at 62-63, 792 A.2d at 348 (citing Police Comm'r of Baltimore City v.
Dowling, 281 Md. 412, 420-21, 379 A.2d 1007, 1012 (1977».
143. Id. at 63,792 A.2d at 348 (citing California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93,
105-06 (1989».
144. See id. at 64,792 A.2d at 349 (citing Hyde v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 473 S.E.2d
680,683 (N.C. Ct. App. 1996); Blake v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 1996 WL 134947,
at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 1996»; see also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
145. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 21 (1997) (Stevens,]., dissenting).
146. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
147. Davidson II, 143 Md. App. at 52, 792 A.2d at 342. The Rule of Illinois Brick
may be re-examined by the Supreme Court in Verizon Communications, Inc.
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seek injunctive relief, they are forced to rely on direct purchasers to
deter exercises of monopoly power on the price of consumer
goods. 148
Barring these potential remedies, private party indirect purchasers
seeking monetary damages pursuant to the MATA will need to either
support legislation explicitly repealing the Rule of Illinois Brick, or provide a sufficient argument to overcome the underlying principles behind Illinois Brick as outlined in Part II. In either case, the discussion
that follows is designed to facilitate that process by outlining both an
applied and intrinsic economic course of action.
A.

Applied Analysis Demonstrates that Direct Purchasers May Have Neither
the Most Effective Deterrent Effect on Antitrust Violators nor the Most
Efficient Means to Uncover and Police Antitrust Violators

An applied approach attacks the first two policy reasons behind the
Rule of Illinois Brick: (1) that direct purchaser claims provide the most
effective deterrence to antitrust violators; and (2) that direct purchasers will provide the most efficient means of both policing antitrust
violators and litigating those violations in court.
First, the theory that direct purchasers provide "maximum deterrence" to bring private actions because they will bring the largest suits
for treble damages is inherently flawed without sufficient empirical
v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, L.L.P. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, L.L.P. v.
Bell Atlantic Corp., 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002), em. granted sub nom. Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis Trinko, L.L.P., 123 S. Ct.
1480 (2003) (reviewing the Second Circuit's reversal of the district court's
dismissal of Trinko's antitrust claim). In Law Offices of Curtis Trinko v. Bell
Atlantic Carp., the Second Circuit allowed an indirect private party purchaser to bring suit pursuant to the Sherman Antitrust Act because the indirect purchaser was directly harmed when "it received poor phone
service[, from then Bell Atlantic,] because it chose to do business with [the
direct purchaser]." 294 F.3d 307, 324-25 (2d Cir. 2002). If Maryland courts
continue to rely on federal guidance in interpreting Maryland's antitrust
law, pursuant to section 11-202 of the Commerical Law Code, then the Supreme Court's ultimate resolution of Verizon might impact Maryland's adherence to Illinois Brick.
148. See Davidson 11,143 Md. App. at 51,792 A.2d at 341 (citing State v.Jonathan
Logan, Inc., 301 Md. 63, 64-65, 482 A.2d 1,1-2 (1984». The Rule of Illinois
Brick prevents indirect purchaser claims for treble-monetary damages, not
injunctive relief. See supra note 4. As such, a private party indirect purchaser could bring an action for injunctive relief in Maryland. MD. CODE
ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-209(b) (2000). As a lesser alternative to injunctive
relief, the court may order restitution to Maryland consumers of an alleged
antitrust violator in equity proceedings brought by the Maryland Attorney
General to prevent or restrain violations of MATA section 11-204. /d. § 11209(a). While the statute explicitly permits restitution to "any person," it
also explicitly recognizes that the court "may" use "all equitable powers" to
fashion an appropriate remedy. Id. § 11-209. This provision regarding restitution damages and all equitable remedies has not been exercised by the
court in a reported opinion.
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studies supporting this proposition. 149 Over the long term, direct purchasers will successfully pass-on 100% or more of the monopoly or cartel overcharge in a competitive market subject to constant returns to
scale. 150 Some markets, based on maintaining a resale profit margin
for the direct consumer, will pass-on more than 100% of the price
increase in the long run. 151 Thus, many, if not most, direct purchasers would have no actual damages to claim against an alleged antitrust
violator and, in turn, have no actual deterrent effect on antitrust
conduct.
From an efficiency perspective, the issue is which party would be the
most efficient litigator against the alleged antitrust violator. fllinois
Brick supporters believe that direct purchasers have the lowest litigation cost and the greatest economic benefit. 152 This model has two
weaknesses; the first is that over time, the economic incentive or benefit to a direct purchaser to pursue a private party antitrust claim is zero
149. See Hovenkamp, supra note 53, at 1727.
150. [d. at 1726-27. Professor Hovenkamp describes the overall market effect as
follows:
[I]fzero profits are earned by the marginal direct purchaser before
the cartel or monopoly comes into existence, any absorption of
overcharge will force at least some direct purchasers to earn negative returns. In the long run these dealers must exit from the market. Equilibrium will be restored when the marginal firm is once
again earning zero returns ... [when] the industry supply curve is
perfectly elastic; thus the consumer price will go up by exactly as
much as the overcharge. If the direct purchaser's resale market is
competitive and subject to economies of scale, the final price to the
consumers will actually increase by more than the cartel {or monopoly]
overcharge . .. from the fact that costs go up as volume decreases in
markets subject to scale economies.
[d. at 1726 n.45 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Hovenkamp's fear
was that in a competitive market, over time, where the majority of direct
purchasers are dealers and retailers (like most American distribution markets), the bulk, if not all of the overcharge would be passed-on to the consumer. [d. at 1727.
151. See generally Robert L. Steiner, The Third Relevant Market, 45 ANTITRUST
BULL. 719, 745-58 (Spring 2000). Steiner explained that the direct purchasers of tobacco from the tobacco cartel in the retail tobacco market would
pass-on price increases to maintain gross retail margins and thus, exploit
the monopoly overcharge. [d. For example, assume that cigarettes can be
manufactured at the marginal price of $0.90 and sold by a monopolist at a
profitable market price of $1.00. The retailers of cigarettes resell their cigarettes to consumers at an established gross margin of 20%, or $1.20. If the
cigarette monopolist raises the price of cigarettes to a monopoly price of
$2.00, the retailers will raise their prices to maintain their gross margin at
20%, or $2.40. Thus, the indirect purchaser will see a $1.40 price increase
for the $1.00 monopoly price increase. See id. Mr. Steiner also acknowledged in his study that economic models based on perfectly competitive
markets often predict/ass-through costs of less or more than 100%, depending on supply an demand calculation assumptions. [d. at 746-47.
152. See Landes & Posner, supra note 50, at 608-09.
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or even negative. 153 The second weakness lies in the basis "that [direct] purchasers suspect and actively investigate possible antitrust violations," and, by default, that direct purchasers are situated with the
best information to pursue antitrust litigation. 154 The best source of
information about an alleged antitrust violation is likely the violator's
employees themselves. 155
Since the economic incentive for a direct purchaser in the long run
and an employee with no actual injury is zero, neither has a particularly significant economic incentive to bring an antitrust lawsuit, which
would provide a deterrent effect against an alleged antitrust violator.
The employee of the alleged antitrust violator, however, by virtue of
his or her actual information, would be the most efficient party to police antitrust violators. In contrast, the direct purchaser, for fear of
retaliation by the monopoly manufacturer, may make a business decision not to pursue antitrust litigation.

B.

Incidence Analysis Can Effectively Demonstrate Pass-Through Costs to
Consumers in Modern Markets 156

The policy underpinning Illinois Brick susceptible to intrinsic economic analysis is that of the allegedly complex calculations required
to show pass-through of the monopoly overcharge by the intermediary
and direct purchasers to the ultimate indirect purchaser-the consumer. 157 When calculating indirect purchaser damages, in contrast
to direct purchaser damages, the burden on showing indirect purchaser damages in Illinois Brick in 1977 seems daunting. 15s Modern
economists have produced reasonable calculations for estimating passthrough costs to indirect purchasers and, in turn, should be able to
avoid the threat of multiple liabilities to alleged antitrust violators. 159
153. See Hovenkamp, supra note 53, at 1727-28; see also supra notes 150-51 and
accompanying text.
154. Hovenkamp, supra note 53, at 1728. Professor Hovenkamp was skeptical
that direct purchasers are more likely to detect antitrust violations. See id.
at 1729. In contrast, he offers a more practical test-the likelihood of detection of an antitrust violation is probably proportional to the number of
"detectives." Id. He recognized that federal government litigation, state
attorneys general litigation, and federal antitrust investigations, settled
without prosecution, consist of the bulk of the "detectors" of antitrust violators, not the direct purchasers themselves. See id.
155. Id. As one analyst stated, "[wJhen actual participants and close students of an
industry testify that something is so, it probably is so." Steiner, supra note 151, at
751.
156. Incidence theory is an economic theory related to the passing-on of costs
that utilizes standard economic analysis tools and assumptions of neoclassical micro-economics. Harris & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 275-76.
157. See id. at 269-71.
158. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
159. See Ronald Cotterill et aI., Beyond Illinois Brick: The Law and Economics of Cost
Pass-Through in the ADM Price Fixing Case, 18 REv. INDUS. ORG. 45, 51 (2001)
(explaining the calculation of pass-through prices with a non-linear de-
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A modern trend at the FTC, in determining whether a potential
merger is substantially likely to lessen competition, is to conduct intrinsic economic analysis and calculate the post-merger price to the
consumer.160 Some antitrust commentators and analysts have seized
on a common hypothesis in merger law-if the actual change in price
from the pending merger can be calculated and the pass-on of this
price change on the consumer can be determined, then there is no
need to calculate market definitions or surrogates to approve a horizontal merger. 161 Instead, the FTC can determine if a horizontal
merger will "tend to create a monopoly" or "substantially . . . lessen
competition"162 by measuring the anticompetitive harm directly to the
consumer.
To frame the same hypothesis in the language of § 4 of the Clayton
Act and the Rule of Illinois Brick, if the actual change in price directed
by the alleged monopolist and suffered by the direct purchaser can be
traced through the pass-on to the ultimate consumer, there would be
no need for an absolute bar to their indirect purchaser claims. 163

160.

161.
162.
163.

mand culVe); C. Robert Taylor, Indirect Damages from Price Fixing: The Alabama Lysine Case, 18 REv. INDUS. ORG. 33, 34-35 (2001) (explaining passthrough of lysine prices in both a vertically integrated market and on a costplus basis); but see Coutroulis & Allen, supra note 38, at 196, 198, 200, 204
(explaining that the calculation of pass-through prices by incidence analysis
of demand cUlVes and market factors to be an ineffective tool in litigating
an titrust claims).
See DEP'T OF ]USTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES (1997). The Horizontal Merger Guidelines selVe as an analytical tool
describing the enforcement policies of the DO] and the FTC in reviewing
horizontal mergers. Id. A significant portion of the Guidelines stress that
the evaluation of surrogate market indicators, such as market definitions,
market power, and market concentration using the Herlindahl-Hirschman
Index, because the DO] and the FTC assume that actually calculating the
ability of the post-merger firm to charge and sustain a monopoly price is
too difficult. See id. While the legal analysis of pass-through costs from efficiencies from a pending horizontal merger through these guidelines differs
from the legal analysis in a § 4 Clayton Act violation, the economic analysis
is identical because it analyzes a company's ability in the relevant market to
pass-through changes in costs to ultimate consumers. See Harris & Sullivan,
supra note 3, at 275-76.
See generally Robert H. Lande & James Langenfield, From the Surrogates to
Stories: The Evolution of Federal Merger Policy, 11 ANTITRUST 5 (1997). See also
supra note 151 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (2000).
See Ill. Brick Co., 431 U.S. at 751 (Brennan,]., dissenting). Supporters of the
Rule of Illinois Brick would quickly argue that the "apparent ease" of such
calculations is no more than a myth and the basis for the legal bar. They
argue, for example, that Microsoft distributed software to consumers
through: (1) original equipment manufacturers; (2) direct purchasers; (3)
mass market wholesalers; and (4) retailers. See Kenneth G. Elzinga and
David E. Mills, PC Software, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 739, 777 (Spring 1999).
Thus, Microsoft implies that determining the actual consumer cost is too
difficult an exercise when one has to consider the impact of quantity discounts and inconsistent pricing patterns throughout the multitude of distribution chains. Id. at 778. In stark contrast, the dissent in Illinois Brick
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A celebrated example of calculating pass-on charges in a horizontal
merger occurred when the FTC reviewed the proposed Staples-Office
Depot merger. 164 The FTC recognized at least three specific factors
in calculating the pass-through of certain cost savings to consumers
post-merger.1 65 These factors were: (1) the shape of the consumer
demand curve; (2) the shape of the marginal cost line; and (3) the
extent of competition in the market. 166 An identical showing of passon pricing, based on the Staples model, could be utilized in an indirect purchaser setting.
Another example of such an analysis of pass-through costs in pricefixing litigation focused on market demand elasticities in the manufacture of carbonated soft drinks ("CSD") from high fructose corn
syrup ("HFCS") .167 This framework assumes basic assumptions that
consumers have imperfect information about retail prices of the ultimate product, CSD, and that the HFCS is used in fixed proportions to
the final product, and is of very small relative value to the final price
of the CSD.168 This framework produced an observed pass-through

164.
165.

166.
167.
168.

twenty-five years earlier explained that a jury could reasonably trace costs
and damages along a complex distribution chain in Perkins v. Standard Oil
Co., 395 U.S. 642 (1969), where the plaintiff alleged a violation of the
Robinson-Pattman Act. Ill. Brick Co., 420 U.S. at 751 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Perkins Court traced the passing-on of discriminatory low prices
through four vertical steps and three horizontal levels in resolving whether
Standard Oil would be liable for damages. Perkins, 395 U.S. at 645. By removing an absolute bar on all indirect claims,Justice Brennan's dissent admitted that there would be cases where the plaintiff would "be unable to
prove that the overcharge was passed-on" or the overcharge calculation
would be only "approximately determinable." Ill. Brick Co., 420 U.S. at 759
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan acknowledged that such reasoned estimations were "required" in antitrust litigation. Id. At that point,
a discernible jury could apply the Zenith and RKO standard. See supra notes
32-33 and accompanying text. In situations where the indirect purchasers'
damages are too remote, Justice Brennan recognized that the alleged antitrust violator should not be subjected to "multiple liability" and courts
should use legal standing to prevent such cases from full litigation. Ill. Brick
Co., 420 U.S. at 761 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Of course, a modern antitrust case would have to satisfy the evidentiary requirements for expert witnesses in accordance with Daubert and Kumho Tire. See supra note 34 and
accompanying text.
See FTC v. Staples, Inc., 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1090 (D.D.C. 1997).
ORLEY AsHENFELTER ET AL., IDENTIFYING THE FIRM-SPECIFIC COST PASSTHROUGH RATE, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Working Paper No. 217, 1-7 (1998).
Essential to the preliminary injunction enjoining consummation of the proposed Staples-Office Depot merger was the FTC showing that Staples expected pass-through efficiency to ultimate consumers was a mere fifteen to
seventeen-percent savings, as opposed to Staples' proclaimed two-thirds savings of the new market efficiency to the consumer. FTC, 970 F. Supp. at
1090.
AsHENFELTER ET AL., supra note 165, at 6-7.
Cotterill et aI., supra note 159, at 45.
Id. at 47.
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rate of 100% under "commonly observed" market demand elasticity169
in competitive, I 70 monopolistic,171 and oligopolistic markets. 172 In
comparison, if demand for the same product in the food manufacturing industry is linear, then the market would seek to maximize prices
and the pass-through would be less than 100%.173
The key conclusion to calculating this HFCS price increase passthrough is recognizing that the demand curve for a respective market
is non-linear. 174 Dr. Cotterill explained that the linear demand curve,
or the classic linear supply-demand "X" curve, was a contrivance of
economic textbooks, not empirical data. 175 In a monopolistic market
with non-linear demand and constant elasticity of demand, the pass169. Id. at 48. Even with pertect information, the 100% pass-through was met
when both the prices of inputs other than HFCS remain constant when
output drops due to higher retail prices and assuming constant returns to
scale. Id. at 47-48. For more explanation of these assumptions, see id. at
48-49.
170. A competitive market "maximizes both allocative efficiency (making what
the consumer wants) and productive efficiency (using the least amount of
resources)." Ernest Gellhorn, An Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 1975
DUKE LJ. 1, 1 (197S). The market price in a competitive market can be
characterized by numerous factors, including: (1) large numbers of buyers
and sellers; (2) the quantity of products bought by an individual buyer or
sold by an individual seller is so small as to not affect the overall market
price; (3) products are homogeneous (buyers have no reason to choose a
particular seller and vice versa); (4) all market members have pertect information; and (S) new competitors can freely enter the market. !d. at 24-2S.
Thus, a firm in a competitive market can maximize profits only by increasing output in response to consumer demand or lowering its own cost of
marginal production. See id. at 28-29.
171. While strict definitions of monopolistic markets vary, factors useful in identifying a monopolistic market are: 1) a single seller; 2) unique products; 3)
substantial barriers to entry into the market; and 4) impertect market
knowledge. Gellhorn, supra note 170, at 29. Idealistically, a monopoly
seller's output produces the output of the entire industry; realistically, the
monopoly seller is one whose output is sufficiently large enough in proportion to the total amount demanded by consumers that he can set his market price to maximize his own profits. Id. at 29-30. Such a seller is insulated
from the loss of consumers by the threat of entry by new competitors or
replacement by substitute products (often called market inelasticity). !d. at
33. Lastly, a monopolistic market is one where the single seller achieves
supra-normal surplus profits at the cost of considerable allocative inefficiency (also dead-weight loss) due to resource misallocation without regard
to consumer demand. Id. at 3S.
172. In an oligopolistic market, sellers are so few that their price and output
decisions become interdependent. Gellhorn, supra note 170, at 38. Because there are so few sellers in the market, any price or output change by
one member can be cancelled immediately by another seller by changing
their respective price or output. Id. Thus, these oligopolists act independent of consumer demand in setting prices and achieve supra-normal
prices and returns, much like in a monopolistic market. See id. at 41.
173. Cotterill et aI., supra note IS9, at SO.
174. Id. at S1.
17S. Id.
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through rate is always greater than 100%.176 Furthermore, even if
elasticity demand became infinite to the monopolistic manufacturer,
the pass-through rate decreases only to 100%.177
VI.

CONCLUSION

While the Rule of Illinois Brick in Maryland has been decided by the
court of special appeals, private party indirect purchasers have fewer
avenues open to them for relief. Pursuant to the Maryland Commercial Code, injunctive relief from an indirect purchaser's litigation, or
undefined equitable relief from a court's discretion in a state's attorney general's action, remain as possible alternate remedies.178
A more aggressive private party indirect purchaser will need to either lobby for legislation that amends the Maryland Commercial Code
to explicitly "repeal" the Rule of Illinois Brick or attempt to survive
summary judgment under the current statute and the decision of Davidson. Lifting the Rule of Illinois Brick may increase the complexities
of antitrust litigation initially, but state courts can relieve themselves
of this additional burden with special masters to determine the extent
of the pass-on. 179 While it is possible that a current appeal to the Supreme Court may modify or eliminate the Rule of Illinois Brick altogether, a private party litigant will likely need to overcome the
substantial barrier in Davidson. To counter this bar, a private party
indirect purchaser may be able to use a combination of the applied

176. Id. at 50. In contrast, Dr. Cotterrill also explained that the pass-through
rate is always lOO% in a competitively structured, profit-maximizing market.
Id. Monopoly or oligopoly markets may also exist with 100% pass-through
where the demand curve is between constant elasticity and linear. Id. at 5051.

177. Id. at 50. As elasticity of demand becomes infinite, consumers select substitute products for the monopoly product and the monopoly market becomes broadened into a competitive market, including the broader market
of the substitute products. Id. Analyses of theoretical markets by other
scholars refute Dr. Cotterill's assertion that the pass-through could be
greater than 100%. See, e.g., Harris & Sullivan, supra note 3, at 274-98 (explaining that a competitive market reseller would pass-through nearly 100%
of the monopoly price, while a monopolist reseller would likely absorb
more of the monopoly price and pass-through less than 100%).
178. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAw II § 11-209 (2000).
179. Greene et ai., supra note 3, at 1155. Greene, O'Connor, and Hubbard explain that such special masters have been used effectively in pass-on determinations in oil overcharge litigation. Id. (citing In re Stripper Well
Exemption Litigation, 578 F. Supp. 586 (D. Kan. 1985». The Stripper Well
court believed that the burden of persuasion was on intermediate purchasers to prove that they had not passed-on the overcharge to ultimate consumers, which would be analogous to pass-on determinations for indirect
purchaser litigation. Id.
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and intrinsic economic analysis tools outlined in Part V to buttress its
argument and survive summary judgment. lso
Christopher Paul Dean

180. See supra notes 149-77 and accompanying text.

